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WHERE PARDONS ARE CONCERNED, SECOND BEST MAY 
NOT BE SO BAD AFTER ALL: A RESPONSE TO CHAD 
FLANDERS 
Cara H. Drinan* 
In his article, Pardons and the Theory of the “Second Best,” 
Professor Flanders asserts that pardons are “second best” in two ways.1 
First, they tend to be granted when the criminal justice system has failed 
in some way.2 Second, pardons “en masse” can reflect racial bias, 
favoritism, and arbitrariness, all of which undermine the integrity of our 
criminal justice system.3  The heart of his article theorizes how pardons 
should be granted in order to avoid such undermining outcomes.4 
Specifically, Flanders contends that pardons cannot be examined 
exclusively at the individual level; rather, executives should consider 
the patterns that emerge when looking at pardons as a whole.5 Using the 
examples of Governor Barbour’s end of term pardons and the pardons 
of George W. Bush’s second administration, Flanders maintains that 
“[a]ctors within the criminal justice system need to be mindful not only 
of how they act in a single case, but of what legal virtues they display 
over time and across many cases.”6 
Professor Flanders makes an important contribution to the literature 
on executive clemency by making one point very clear: process matters. 
Process, of course, matters with respect to all aspects of our criminal 
justice system, but it matters in a particular way for pardons. An 
executive’s pardon power, unlike most of our criminal justice system, is 
usually unchecked by pre-determined process. In fact, in many 
instances, the lack of process is by design. On one hand, unbridled 
executive clemency enables agility and swift action. On the other hand, 
such lack of process and regulation can court arbitrariness and blatant 
unfairness. It is the latter outcome that concerns Professor Flanders, and 
he offers some initial thoughts on how executives might constrain their 
pardon power so as to minimize unfair outcomes at the wholesale level. 
In asserting that process matters, Professor Flanders introduces, 
perhaps unwittingly, an important question that relates to the timing of 
pardons. Many executive actors, like Governor Barbour, whose pardons 
are core to Flanders’s thesis, grant pardons at the end of their term. But 
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not all executive actors do. In fact, President George W. Bush, whose 
pardons are also featured in Flanders’s article, granted 189 pardons over 
a six-year period.7 Maryland’s Governor Robert J. Ehrlich Jr., whose 
commitment to executive clemency continues today despite his no 
longer being an elected official, regularly exercised his clemency 
authority while in office.8 In general, regular clemency grants—as 
opposed to end of term grants en masse—are a good thing. Routine 
exercise of the pardon power theoretically should normalize the process 
for the public, which may be otherwise wary of it, and rationalizing its 
operation should enhance fairness. Yet, if Professor Flanders is correct 
that “sometimes a pardon is wrong only when compared to other 
instances of pardons granted or not granted,”9 regular exercise of the 
pardon power is very problematic. How could or would a Governor, for 
example, anticipate the pardon applications that may be coming in the 
future and their relative merits? I do not think Professor Flanders is 
suggesting that end-of-term pardons are a necessary condition to a fair 
pardon process, but his argument that pardons have to be considered as 
a whole raises the question of how executive actors can do such a 
holistic analysis prospectively. This question would be a worthwhile 
inquiry in future scholarship, but Flanders’s primary point that 
executives should consider pardons in the aggregate is an important one.  
Flanders states that his account of the pardon power “tries to be 
unobjectionable,”10 and that his Article “does not mean to court 
controversy,”11 and yet I think there are at least two ways in which it 
does. First, it is not clear why he chose to apply his thesis to the pardons 
of Governor Barbour and those from the second Bush administration. 
Governor Barbour’s 2012 end of term pardons certainly generated a 
great deal of media attention—and even an unsuccessful legal 
challenge—but, as I have argued elsewhere, Governor Barbour’s 
pardons are really an example of what not to do in granting clemency.12 
They lacked transparency; they afforded little to no notice to victims’ 
family members; and they occurred at the very end of the Governor’s 
term without advance explanation to the public. It may be that Professor 
Flanders wanted to use Governor Barbour as a case study precisely 
because his pardons were granted en masse and at the end of his term, 
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and thus they are more amenable to consideration as a whole. However, 
the same is not true of those pardons granted during the second Bush 
administration—or for that matter, the entire administration of George 
W. Bush. I wish that Flanders had defended these two examples as valid 
case studies for his thesis. At the very least, his pairing of these two 
examples resurrects my earlier question: how would an executive who 
regularly grants clemency examine such grants at the wholesale level? 
And if there is such a way to do so, does this mean we need a different 
theory for pardons depending on the timing of the process? 
The second way in which Flanders may court controversy is by 
indirectly suggesting that executives should scale back their use of the 
pardon power. Now, to be clear, Flanders is not directly advocating this, 
and in fact, he recognizes that others have called for an expansion in 
pardons, and he calls himself a defender of pardons.13 Yet, there are two 
problems. Grants of clemency, especially at the state level, are at an 
historic low.14 To suggest that executive actors in such a climate need to 
be cautious and vet not just each clemency application but clemency 
grants en masse seems to argue with a straw man. Moreover, if 
executive actors are already worried about the potential fallout 
associated with any particular pardon, and they are, Flanders offers 
them additional reasons to not grant clemency—the fear that, taken as a 
whole, their pardons will appear to reflect discrimination, favoritism or 
arbitrariness.  
Based on his article, I suppose that Flanders would respond that 
executive actors need not fear such reprisal so long as they employ the 
anti-discrimination and other norms he proposes. But that only takes the 
discussion so far; we still need to wrestle with how those norms can 
operate prospectively for an executive who wants to regularly exercise 
clemency. And my bigger concern is that executive actors who already 
have little to gain, and much to lose, from pardons will simply decide it 
is not worth it. 
Flanders’s central point is of paramount importance: process matters, 
both for optics and for fairness. I hope that in future works Flanders 
develops this thesis in greater detail, with a particular focus on how to 
operationalize the norms he proposes.   
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